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Reflections on Khawar:
Recognizing the Refugee from Family Violence
Stephen M Knight
The progressive development of refugee law, to recognize family
violence and other forms of gender violence as a 'basis for asylum took a
major step forward in April 2002 with the decision by the High Court of
Australia in the Khawar case. I For more than fifteen years, advocates,
scholars, and activists have been Working to keep refugee law in pace with
the recognition of gender violence in international law as a human rights
concern.2 With the Khawar decision, Australia's highest court has joined a
growing body of jurisprudence among state parties to the international
Refugee Convention 3 establishing asylum as a recognized protection for
women fleeing gender abuses such as domestic violence, honor killing, and
prostitution.
The central building blocks of this progress have been statements by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), nonbinding guidelines issued by governments, and decisions by individual
asylum adjudicators and administrative appeals boards. Standing on this
foundation, more and more courts are issuing precedent-setting decisions
that can be then relied on at all levels in deciding future asylum cases. The
issuance of new supportive guidelines for gender-related claims by the

• J.D. 1996, University of California, Hastings College of the Law; B.A. 1987, Yale
University. Coordinating Attorney at the Center for Gender & Refugee Studies (CGRS).
I. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574,
2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http;llwww.austlii.edu.aulaulcaseslcthlhigh_ctl2002
114.htrnl ([2002] HCA 14).
2. See, e.g., Declaration on the Elimination of Violence against Women, G.A. Res.
481104, U.N. GAOR, 48th Sess., Supp. No. 49, U.N. Doc. Al48/49 (1993); REPORT OF THE
FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, at 157, U.N. Doc. AlCONF.177/20, U.N. Sales
No. E.96JV.13 (1995); Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Violence against Women, June 9, 1994, 27 U.S.T. 3301, reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1534.
3. United Nations Convention relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19
U.S.T.6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 150 [hereinafter Refugee Convention]; see also United Nations
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6224, T.I.A.S. No.
6577.
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UNHCR in May 2002 has buttressed this progress.
Moreover, since
refugee law is based on an international treaty, decisions of other countries
are persuasive authority in interpreting the core asylum definition in the
United States.
With Khawar, Australia now stands with the United Kingdom, Canada,
New Zealand, and other countries in recognizing gender violence as a
proper basis for a grant of asylum. However, as more countries follow suit,
resistance to this line of authority in the U.S. continues to gather steam,
seeking to undermine the progress made in the 1990s. Often, it is the
complex issue of the link, or "nexus," to one of the five Convention
grounds for granting asylum that is seized upon to deny gender asylum
cases. The Khawar decision provides a strong example of a way out of this
dilemma, one that should be welcomed by adjudicators in the U.S.

I.

BACKGROUND

Pursuant to the Refugee Convention, and under U.S. and Australian
law, a refugee is defined as a person who
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted. for reasons of [1]
race, [2] religion, [3] nationality, membership of a particular [4]
social group or [5] political opinion, .is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable ,or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not having a
nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual
residence, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to
it. 5

4, Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the
Context of Article lA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, UNHCR, at 2, para. I, U.N. Doc. HCRJGlP/02/02 (2002); Guidelines on
International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the Context of
Article lA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of
Refugees, UNHCR, at 3, paras. 11-12, U.N. Doc. HCRJGlP/02/02 (2002).
5. Refugee Convention, supra note 3, art. I § A, para. 2, 189 U.N.T.S. at 184
(illustrating the five Convention grounds for asylum).
Australian law provides for the granting of a "protection visa" to individuals "to
whom ... Australia has protection obligations under the Refugee Convention as amended
by the Refugees Protocol." Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. I.
Under U.S. law, the language varies only slightly. The Immigration and Nationality
Act defines a refugee as,
Any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality or, in the
case of a person having no nationality, is outside any country in which such
person last habitually resided, and who is unable or unwilling to return to,
and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or herself of the protection of,
that country because of persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on
account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.
immigration and Nationality Act § IOI(a)(42)(A), 8 U.S.C. § I 101 (a)(42)(A) (1998).
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While refugee claims from women fleeing gender-related persecution can
be . linked to any ground of asylum, they are most often made under the
political opinion, religion, or particular social group grounds.
In recent decades, violence against women and girls - which often
occurs in the private rather than public sphere, is carried out by family or
community members rather than by the government or its agents, and is
justified by reference to culture or religion - has come to be viewed as an
important human rights concern.6 Parallel progress has been made
regarding the rights of women under international refugee law. In 1985,
the UNHCR Executive Committee encouraged parties to the Refugee
Convention to consider asylum claims from women based on membership
in gender-based social groupS. 7 Throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s,
the UNHCR Executive Committee adopted a series of conclusions aimed at
affording more meaningful protection to women fleeing persecution in their
home countries. 8 Canada, the United States, and other countries responded
in the 1990s with relevant policy guidelines. 9
6. See, e.g., G.A. Res. 48/104, supra note 2, at 217; see also Vienna Declaration and
Programme of Action, World Conference on Human Rights, June 14-25, 1993, para. 18,
U.N. Doe. AlCONF.l57/23 (1993); REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD CONFERENCE ON
WOMEN, supra note 2; Inter-American Convention on the Prevention, Punishment and
Eradication of Viole nee against Women, supra note 2.
The Beijing Platform for Action, contained in the Report of the Fourth World
Conference on Women, defines violence against women as "any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physicid, sexual, or psychological harm or
suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty, whether occurring in public or private life." REPORT OF THE FOURTH WORLD
CONFERENCE ON WOMEN, supra note 2, at para. 113 (1995). The Declaration on the
Elimination of Violence against Women specifically provides that States have a
responsibility whether the acts are carried out by the state or private persons, and declares
that neither "custom, tradition, or religious consideration" can be invoked to justify acts of
violence against women. G.A. Res. 48/104, supra note 2, at 217.
7. Executive Committee Conclusions: Refugee Women and International Protection,
UNHCR Executive Committee, 36th Sess., No. 39, para. (k) (1985), available at
http://www.unhcr.chlcgi-binltexis/vtxlexcom.
8. For example, the UNHCR Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women encourage
states to consider women who face severe violence for violating social mores governing the
role of women as a "social group." Guidelines on the Protection of Refugee Women,
UNHCR, para. 54, U.N. Doc. ES/SCP/67 (1991)., The gender-related Executive Committee
Conclusions are collected on the CGRS web site. Center for Gender and Refugee Studies,
UNHCR & UN Documents on Gender & Asylum, at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrsllaw
lunhcr.html (last visited May 20, 2003).
9. See, e.g., Consideration for Asylum Officers Adjudicating Asylum Claims for Women,
Office of International Affairs, U.S. Immigration and Naturalization Service (May 26,
1995); Refugee and Humanitarian Visa Applicants: Guidelines on Gender Issues for
Decision Makers, Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (July 1996), at
http://www.uchastings,edulcgrsllaw/guidelineslaust.pdf (Australia); Guideline 4: Women
Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Immigration and Refugee Board
Ottawa, Canada (Nov. 13, 1996), http://www.irb.gc.calenlaboutlguidelines/womenlindex
_e.htm; Women Refugee Claimants Fearing Gender-Related Persecution, Immigration and
Refugee Board of Canada (Mar. 9, 1993), http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulother/alrc
Ipublicationslreports/69/vol1lALRC69App2.html#ALRC69 App2; Gender Guidelines for
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Courts of numerous state parties to the Refugee Convention have
granted refugee protection to women fleeing gender-related harm,
including family violence. 10 Domestic violence as a ground for refugee
protection is well established in Canadian case law. I I In 1999, the House
of Lords - the United Kingdom's highest court - ruled that Pakistani
women survivors of domestic violence were eligible for refugee statuS. 12
Refugees in Australia have been requesting, and in some cases
receiving, asylum based on fear of domestic violence since the mid1990s. 13 Some twenty-five percent of the small number of asylum cases
brought in the middle part of the' 1990s were granted. 14 In a 1994 case
involving domestic violence, the Australian Refugee Review Tribunal
noted that, in addition to sharing the immutable characteristic of gender,
women have "shared common social characteristics" that make them
cognizable as a social group:
That domestic violence... is regarded in many countries as a
private problem rather than a public crime, can be directly
attributed to women's social status; to the fact that historically, in
many societies, women have been, and in many instances still are,
regarded as being the private property of firstly their fathers then
their husbanq.s. That women face differential treatment within the
legal system, arising from their social status, is evident from the
focus given to women and violence, against women, in for example,

Asylum Atljudication, National Consortium on Refugee Affairs (Nov. 1999), available at
http://www.web.cal-ccr/safr.PDF (South Africa); Asylum Gender Guidelines, Immigration
Appeal Authority (Nov. 2000), http://www.iaa.gov.uk/GenInfo/IAA-Gender.htm (U.K.).
The list of countries with gender guidelines now also includes the Netherlands, Norway, and
Sweden. See Center for Gender & Refugee Studies, Gender Asylum Law from the Center
for Gender & Refugee Studies, at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrs/law/law.html(last visited
May 21, 2003).
10. See, e.g., Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2 AC. 629 (H.L.
1999) (U.K.) (Pakistani women subjected to domestic violence); Refugee Appeal No.
71427/99 [2000] N.Z.A.R. 545 (New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals Authority) (Iranian
woman subjected to domestic violence), available at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrs/law
Iint1l71427-99.html.
11. See, e.g., Lim v. Minister of Citizenship & Immigration, [2000] F.C. IMM-4333-99,
available at http://decisions.fct-cf.gc.calfctl2000/imm-4333-99.html; Minister of
Employment & Immigration v. Mayers, [1992] C.A. A544-92 (Fed. Ct.), available at
http://reports.fja.gc.calfc/1993/pub/vIl1993fca0448.html; Case No. AA-01226 (Mar. 19,
2001) (Convention Refugee Determination Division) (Russian lesbian abused by her exhusband).
12. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 AL.R. 574,
at paras. 11-14, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulcases
IcthJhigh_ctl20021l4.html ([2002] HCA 14) (citing ex parte Shah, 2 A.C. at 635); see also
Deborah E. Anker et al., Defining "Particular Social Group" in Terms of Gender: The Shah
Decision and U.S. Law, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1005 (1999).
13. Scott McKenzie, Beaten Wives Given Asylum, Political Refugees to Suffer,
ADVERTISER (Adelaide), Dec. 16, 1996, at 2.
14. See MARY CROCK, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW IN AUSTRALIA 149 (1998).
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the U.S. Department of State Country Reports. . .. That women
share a common social status is further evidenced by the
establishment of the United Nations Commission on the Status of
Women and other formal mechanisms for the advancement of
women's status including the U.N. Decade for Women from 1975
to 1985. 15
But several cases decided by the Refugee Review Tribunal have denied
asylum to petitioners who s'ought relief on the basis of family vioience,I6
and few such cases had made their way to federal court. It appears that no
such case had been upheld prior to Khawar. 17
The United States has played a mixed role in this international
progress .. Advocates for women's rights and refugees successfully lobbied
for gender guidelines for judges making refugee status determinations and,
as noted above, in 1995 the United States became, after Canada, the second
country to publish such guidelines. In 1996, the Kasinga decision
recognized fear of female genital mutilation as a basis for asylum in the
United States. IS Building on those two developments, many women fleeing
gender-based harms have been granted asylum. 19 But there remains a
dearth of precedent since the two important decisions since 1999 one
positive and one negative have been erased from the books?O Progress
has been further stymied by ongoing opposition to the granting of asylum
in such cases from within the Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) and among many asylum adjudicators. 21
Adjudicators in the United States often have particular difficulty
finding a legal "nexus" between the persecution and one of the five

15. Refugee Review Tribunal Reference: N93/00656 (Aug. 3, 1994) (Australian Refugee
Review Tribunal), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/caseslcthlrrtJN9300656.htrnl (woinan from
Philippines granted asylum based on domestic violence).
16. Refugee Review Tribunal Reference: V95/03639 (May 2, 1996), http://www.austlii
.edu.au/au/caseslcthlrrtN9503639.htrnl; Refugee Review Tribunal Reference: N94/06178
(Oct. 9, 1995), http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlrrtJN9406178.htrnL
17. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Ndege (1999) 59 A.L.D.
758 ([1999] FCA 783), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlfederal_ctlI999
1783.html; Basa v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (1998) F.C.A. 830,
http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/caseslcthlfederal_ctl1998/830.htrnl ([1998] 830 FCA).
18. In re Kasinga, 21 I. & N. Dec. 357 (B.IA 1996).
19. See, e.g., In re R-A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (B.IA 1999); Stephen M. Knight, Seeking
Asylum from Gender Persecution: Progress amid Uncertainty, 79 INTERPRETER RELEASES
689,689-90 (2002).
20. Aguirre-Cervantes v. INS, 242 F.3d 1169 (9th Cir. 2001), vacated, 273 F.3d 1220
(9th Cir. 2001); In re R· A·, Interim Dec. 3403 (B.LA. 1999), vacated (AG 2001). For more
on the legal and political struggles leading to the overturning of these cases, see Knight,
supra note 19, at 690-91; Karen Musalo & Stephen Knight, Steps Forward and Steps Back:
Uneven Progress in the Law of Social Group and Gender-based Claims in the United
States, 13 INT'LJ. OF REFUGEE L. 51, 52-58 (2001).
21. See Knight, supra note 19, at 695-96.
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requisite Convention grounds for asylum?2 This article will take a close
look at the Khawar decision and at the developing international consensus
towards a way out of this confused and unnecessarily complex legal
quandary.

II. FACTS
Ms. Naima Khawar is a Pakistani woman who fled her native country
after years of escalating physical abuse at the hands of her husband. She
and her husband were married in 1980 against the wishes of his family,
who had arranged for him to marry a relative?3 Without his parents'
approval, her parents also disapproved. After a period of separation, Ms.
Khawar's husband began to see his family again in the mid-1980s. His
family remained highly critical of her, and her husband began to take their
point of view. He was unhappy when they had a second daughter, instead
of a male child. The abuse from the husband and his family escalated to
physical violence. At the same time, Ms. Khawar's own family became
less able to protect her. She knew that if she left hl;:r husband, he would
take the children away. This threat frightened her into staying with him,
despite the ongoing persecution.
Ms. Khawar went to the police on several occasions over a number of
years. Her first complaint was dismissed with the comment that domestic
violence was widespread and that "if [the police] had to do something
about all the similar complaints it would take all their time.,,24 When she
returned to the police more than a year later to report that her husband had
threatened to bum her alive, she brought her sister's husband in hope that a
man's presence would lead the police to act. 25 But the police failed to
accurately record her complaint. Her fourth and final trip to the police,
after she had been doused with petrol, ended with a dismissive comment by
a police officer that women always seek to blame their husbands for their
own problems. 26 She returned home to find that her husband had left; he
stayed away for two to three weeks, during which time Ms. Khawar

22. For an introduction and full discussion of the nexus issue, see KAREN MUSALO ET AL.,
REFUGEE LAW AND POLlCY 275-324 (1998). See generally Shayna S. Cook, Repairing the
Legacy of INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 23 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 223 (2002); Michelle Foster,
Causation in Context: Interpreting the Nexus Clause in the Refugee Convention, 23 MICH. 1.
INT'L L. 265 (2002); James C. Hathaway, International Refugee Law: The Michigan
Guidelines on Nexus to a Convention Ground, 23 MICH. 1. INT'L L. 207 (2002).
23. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2000) 101 F.C.R. 501,
para. 95, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ctJ2000/1130.htmI
([2000] FCA 1130).
24. Jd. at para. 97.
25. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar(2002) 187 A.L.R. 574,
para. 94, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthihigh
_ctJ2002/14.htrnl ([2002] HCA 14).
26. Jd.
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decided to flee Pakistan. 27

III. THE DECISIONS BELOW
A. THE REFUGEE REVIEW TRIBUNAL
With her three children, Ms. Khawar entered Australia in June 1997
and applied for asylum in September of that year. Her case was rejected in
February 1998 by an administrative officer, and she appealed to the
Refugee Review Tribunal (hereinafter Tribunal).28 Ms. Khawar proposed
that she was a member of a number of particular social groups, including,
among others, "women," "married women in Pakistan without the
protection of a male relative," and "women who have transgressed the
mores of Pakistani society.,,29
Ms. Khawar submitted substantial material in her attempt to show that
there is "a systematic failure by police authorities in Pakistan" with respect
to efforts by victims of domestic violence to gain protection,30 including
substantial documentation "concerning the negative attitude of the
Pakistani authorities to complaints by women in [her] position.,,3l
In January 1999, the Tribunal issued its decision denying her claim for
asylum.32 Although the Tribunal noted that there was an anonymous
allegation in the record that Ms. Khawar had fabricated her story in
collaboration with her husband, the court accepted as credible her
allegations of abuse,33 and held that the treatment Ms. Khawar was
subjected to did amount to persecution. 34 However, the Tribunal ruled that
she failed to make out a case for asylum because the court did not see any
link between the persecution and a ground for asylum.
It is clear to the Tribu~al that the problems which the applicant

faced with her husband were problems peculiar to their
relationship. There is nothing in the evidence before the Tribunal
to suggest that the applicant was being targeted by her husband or
his family for a Convention reason. She was being harmed and
harassed because of the particular dynamics of the family into

27. Khawar (2000), 101 F.C.R. 501, at para. 102 .
. 28. !d. at para. 86.
29. Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 52.
30. !d. at para. 53.
31. Jd. at paras. 95, 97. As summarized by Justice Kirby, these materials included reports
from Amnesty International and the U.S. Department of State, a human rights brief by the
Canadian Immigration and Refugee Board, and a cable from the Australian Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade. Jd.
32. !d. at para. 7.
33. !d. at para. 51.
34. !d. at para. 99.

34

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 14:1

which she married and the circumstances of her marriage. 35
The Tribunal did not make a ruling regarding any of the social groups
to which Ms. Khawar alleged she belonged, nor did it suggest an
alternative group. Instead, it rested its denial on the basis that there was no
nexus to a Convention ground and that Ms. Khawar had been harmed for
solely personal reasons because her husband's family members "were
angry or shamed by the fact that he married her fi)f love when he was
already engaged to a relative and because she brought no dowry to the
family. She was also seen as being responsible for her husband being
estranged from his family for five years.,,36 "The Convention," declared
the Tribunal, "was not intended to provide protection to people involved in
personal disputes.,,3?
Regarding Ms. Khawar's submissions pertaining to the police and the
failure of governmental protection in Pakistan, the Tribunal made no
factual findings. 38
B.

THE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS

I.

The First Appeal

Ms. Khawar appealed the denial of her asylum claim to the Federal
Court. She asserted that the Tribunal's failure to make factual findings on
her efforts to gain police protection from her husband amounted to an error
oflaw. 39
4o
A Federal Court judge reversed the denial of asylum to Ms. Khawar.
Relying in part on a UK. decision by the House of Lords in the Shah
case,41 the judge found that the Tribunal had erred in failing to make
findings of fact regarding Ms. Khawar's efforts to gain protection from the
State. In addition, the Federal Court ruled that the Tribunal's failure to
determine whether Ms. Khawar was a member of any particular social
group was a legal error: "[T]he tribunal reached a conclusion on the
question of whether [the applicant's] fear of persecution was for reason of
her membership of a particular social group without first identifying the

35. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2000) 101 F.C.R. 501,
para. 103, available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cth/federal_ctl2000/1130.html
([2000] FCA 1130).
36. ld. at para. 104.
37. ld. at para. 105.
38. ld. at para. 107.
39. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574,
para. 54, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlhigh
_ctl2002114.html ([2002] HCA 14).
40. Khawar v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affilirs (1999) 168 A.L.R. 190
([1999] FCA 1529).
41. Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2 A.c. 629 (H.L. 1999)
(U.K.). For more on this decision see Anker et aI., supra note 12.

Winter 2003]

REFLECTIONS ON KHA WAR

35

relevant social group, if any, of which [the applicant] was a member.,,42
The judge cited to ex parte Shah, noting that the U.K. House of Lords had
found married women in Pakistan to be a social group.43
2. The Second Appeal

The government appealed this ruling to the full Federal Court, which,
on August 23, 2000, affirmed the judge's decision overturning the
Tribunal, by a split vote of two to one.44
Writing for the majority (one judge concurred without opinion), Judge
Lindgren relied in part on ex parte Shah, as well as on the decision of the
Australian High Court in Chen, which ruled that persecution under the
Refugee Convention does not require "enmity" by the persecutor. 45 Chen
stands for the concept that "persecution" can take the form of a
discriminatory withholding by the state from the members of a particular
social group of goods or services that the state provides to other persons. ,>46
The decision described two alternative legal theories under which Ms.
Khawar's claim to asylum can be viewed. Under one view, the conduct of
the Pakistani authorities in withholding police protection against violence
from members of a particular social group alone stands as persecution "on
account of' membership in that groUp.47 By the other view, it is the
conduct of the husband and the state together that links the persecution to
the social group of which she is a member. 48
In support of this latter view, the court quoted Lord Hoffman's
powerful example, from ex parte Shah, of the Jewish shopkeeper; it is
worth quoting at length.
Suppose oneself in Germany in 1935 .... [S]uppose that the Nazi
government in those early days did not actively organise violence
against Jews, but pursued a policy of not giving any protection to
Jews subjected to violence by neighbours. A Jewish shopkeeper is
attacked by a gang organised by an Aryan competitor who smash
his shop, beat him up and threaten to do it again if he remains in
business. The competitor and his gang are motivated by business
rivalry and a desire to settle old personal scores, but they would not
have done what they did unless they knew that the authorities
42. Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 55.
43. Id.
44. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2000) 101 F.C.R. 501,
available at http://www.austlii.edu.auJauJcases!cthlfederal_ctJ20001l130.html([2000] FCA
1130).
45. Chen Shi Hai v. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs (2000) 170
A.L.R. 553, 2000 WL 1241956 ([2000J HCA 19); Khawar (2000), 101 F.C.R. 501, at paras.
113-22.
46. Khawar (2000).101 F.C.R. 501. at para. 121.
47. Id. at paras. 124-29.
48. Id. at paras. 130-36.
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would allow them to act with impunity. And the ground upon
which they enjoyed impunity was that the victim was a Jew. Is he
being persecuted on grounds of race? Again, in my opinion, he is.
An essential element in the persecution, the failure of the
authorities to provide protection, is based upon race. It is true that
one answer to the question "Why was he attacked?" would be
"because a competitor wanted to drive him out of business." But
another answer, and in my view the right answer in the context of
the Convention, would be "he was attacked by a competitor who
knew that he would receive no protection because he was a Jew.,,49
This analysis is clearly applicable to the situation of much violence against
women, which occurs in an atmosphere of impunity because of official
discrimination, repression, and neglect. Judge Lindgren also noted the
following equation applied by Lord Hoffman (in Shah): "Persecution =
Serio.us Harm + The Failure of State Protection.,,50 Under this equation, the
required nexus can be found based on a failure or' absence of state
protection that itself is linked to a Convention ground.
Concluding its analysis, the Australian federal judge ruled that the
requisite nexus to a Convention ground was to be found in the social
context in which the domestic violence took place.
I would hold that a state perception of a particular social group as
"inferior," "less deserving" or "second class" by reference to the
rest of society, and, in particular, a view of members of the group
as not possessing the same human rights as the rest of society or, if
possessing them, as not entitled to have them enforced and
protected to the same extent as the rest of society, would constitute
a motivation that would be entirely consonant with the
Convention's definition and preamble. In the present case, there
was evidence before the [Refugee Review Tribunal] on which it
might have found that "women in Pakistan" or "married women in
Pakistan" are so regarded and also that such a view of Ms. Khawar
formed part of the attitude of her husband and his family and the
police, that caused them to act towards her as they did. 51
The government again appealed against this decision, this time to
Australia's highest court.

49. Id. at para. 133 (quoting Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte Shah, 2
AC. 629, paras. 653-54 (H.L. 1999) (UK) (emphasis added)).
50. Id. at para. 132 (quoting ex parte Shah, 2 AC. 629, at para. 653; citing REFUGEE
WOMEN'S LEGAL GROUP, GENDER GUIDELINES FOR THE DETERMINATION OF ASYLUM CLAIMS
IN THE UK 5 (1998)).
51. Id. at para. 141.
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IV. KHAWAR: THE HIGH COURT'S OPINION
On April II, 2002, the Australian High Court rejected the
government's appeal and affirmed the Federal Court's reversal of the
Tribunal's decision. 52 The High Court sat in a panel of five justices; four
justices voted in the majority, writing three separate decisions. There was
one dissent. 53
That the protection of the Refugee Convention extends to individuals
persecuted by non-State actors was not contested. 54 On its appeal to the
High Court, the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs framed
the case as raising two issues:
[W]hether the failure of the country of nationality of an applicant
for a protection visa to provide effective police protection against
domestic violence to members of a particular social group is
capable itself of constituting persecution for reasons of a
[Convention] ground ... [, and] whether fear of harm directed at
the applicant by a non-State agent for non-Convention reasons,
together with or in the knowledge of the failure of the state of
nationality to provide effective police protection against such 'harm
to members of a particular social group to which the applicant
belongs, "is capable of giving rise to protection obligations" to the
applicant. 55
For his part, Chief Justice Gleeson presented the question before the High
Court as follows:
The first issue is whether the failure of a country of nationality to
provide protection against domestic violence to women, in
circumstances· where the motivation of the perpetrators of the
violence is private, can result in persecution of the kind referred to
in Art. IA(2) of the Convention.
The second issue is whether women (or, for present purposes,
women in Pakistan) may constitute a particular social group within
the meaning of the Convention. 56
Thus the High Court was squarely presented with the purely legal question
of whether domestic violence could be a basis for Refugee Convention
protection in Australia. 57
52. See Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R.
574, paras. 36-37, 88-90, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.au
/aulcases/cthlhigh_ctl2002/14.html ([2002] HCA 14).
53. Id at paras. 133, 157.
54. /d. at para. 114.
55. Id. at paras. 58-59.
56. /d. at paras. 5-6.
57. Much space is devoted, in two of the three affinning opinions, to a discussion of the
original understanding of "state protection" under the Convention, the result of the
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THE STANDARD OF REVIEW

The opinion of Justice Michael Donald Kirby dealt at greatest length
with the most relevant issues. At the outset, Justice Kirby directly
addressed a core question regarding the nature of the objection to the
Tribunal's decision: Was the Tribunal's error factual or legal? This can be
a critical question because of the differing standard of review for legal
versus factual questions on appeal. Justice Kirby extensively detailed
certain factual material presented by Ms. Khawar, including her repeated
complaints to the police and her evidentiary submissions regarding the
rights and status of women in Pakistan. 58 Justice Kirby ruled that the
Tribunal committed a legal error when it failed to consider this evidence,
apparently deeming it irrelevant once it had ruled that Ms. Khawar was not
persecuted "for reasons of' her membership in any social group.59
Taken in isolation such a finding might seem to be one of fact assigning the harm that was accepted to have been proved to a
cause based on a particular family's domestic disputes. If that
were all, the decision would have to be affirmed by the courts,
confined as they are in this respect to correcting errors of law on
the part of administrative decision-makers.
But when the
significant factual material tendered by the respondent is taken into
account, the material before the Tribunal arguably takes on a
different character. It is then possible, indeed essential, to consider
the family dispute concerning the respondent in the light of the
material about the serious legal, social and practical disadvantages
suffered by the respondent and women in her position which she
presented to the Tribunal. The Tribunal might still conclude that
the respondent did not fall within the Convention definition. But it

government's urging the High Court to find that "persecution and protection are distinct
concepts" under refugee law. This historical discussion is of limited relevance here, and I
will not go into it in detail. To briefly summarize, a question arose around the significance
of part of the phrasing of the definition of refugee by the Refugee Convention, as a person
who, "owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion, is outside the
country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself
of the protection of that country." Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v.
Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574, para. 60, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www
.austlii.edu.au/au/cases/cthlhigh_ctl20021l4.html ([2002] HCA 14) (emphasis added).
Suffice it to say that, while it appears that the "original intent" of the emphasized language
may have referred literally to external proteetion - in the sense of the refugee seeking out
the embassy or consulate of her country of origin - "there now e)(jsts jurisprudence that has
attributed considerable importance in refugee status determination to the availability of state
protection inside the country of origin ...." Id. at para. 72 (quoting UNHCR, Interpreting
Article I of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, paras. 35-36 (April
2001» (emphasis added).
58. Id. at paras. 94-98.
59. Id. at paras. 99-100.
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could scarcely do so lawfully without considering, and making
essential findings of fact about, the case that the respondent had
propounded to bring herself within the Convention definition. In
short ... it was not open to the Tribunal to ignore the respondent's
claim that her case was a paradigm instance of the discrimination
of Pakistani law and official practice against women in her
position, which amounted to persecution, justifying her fear about
returning to Pakistan. 6o
Thus the High Court reviewed the Tribunal's decision as an error of law.
B. PERSECUTION AND STATE PROTECTION

Justices Michael McHugh and William Gummow, writing jointly,
accepted the following propositions put forward by Ms. Khawar:
[T]hat (a) she was unable to obtain police protection in respect of
the domestic violence she suffered; (b) that state of affairs
represented a denial of fundamental rights otherwise enjoyed by
nationals in Pakistan; and (c) it was a foon of selective or
discriminatory treatment which amounted to persecution by the
State authorities. 6t
The justices ruled that "the persecution in question lies in the
discriminatory inactivity of State authorities in not responding to the
violence of non-State actors.,,62 The justices explained that the legal
difficulty for the High Court in making a final decision in the case arose
because the Tribunal itself made "no findings of fact upon Mrs. Khawar's
allegation that she could not obtain police protection in respect of the
domestic violence she suffered.,,63
For his part, Justice Kirby ruled that it is "sufficient that there is both a
risk of serious harm to the applicant from human sources and a failure on
the part of the state to afford protection that is adequate to uphold the basic
human rights and dignity of the person concerned.,,64 Relying on a wellknown if unreported decision from the New Zealand Refugee Status
Appeals Authority,65 Justice Kirby presented the following classification of
cases based on the level of State involvement:

60. Id. at para. 100.
61. Id. at para. 79.
62. [d. at para. 87.
63. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574,
para. 80, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulcases/cthlhigh
_ctl2002/14.html ([2002] HCA 14).
64. Id. at para. 115.
65. Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 [2000] N.Z.A.R. 545, para. 60 (New Zealand Refugee
Status Appeals Authority), available at http://www.uchastings.edulcgrsllaw/intI171427-99
.html.
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a. Persecution committed by the state concerned.
b. Persecution condoned by the state concerned.
c. Persecution tolerated by the state concerned.
d. Persecution not condoned or not tolerated by thl! state concerned
nevertheless present because the state either refus~:s or is unable to
offer adequate protection. 66
Justice Kirby quoted the New Zealand court's reasoning at length for the
proposition that the nexus requirement is satisfied where there is a showing
of a link between a Convention ground and either th<! harm amounting to
persecution, .or to the failure of protection by the state. He restated the
equation referenced by the court below: "Persecution = Serious Harm +
The Failure of State Protection.,,67 The Tribunal's decision must be
reversed, explained Justice Kirby, because that body's failure to make
factual findings with respect to State protection constituted "a failure to
address one of two grounds where the respondent was entitled to succeed if
she made either of them good.,,68 "This is because 'persecution' is a
construct of [these] two separate but essential elements .... Logically, if
either of the two constitutive elements is 'for reason of a Convention
ground, the summative construct is itself for reason of a Convention
ground.,,69
To illustrate the impact of the Tribunal's error in failing to consider the
evidence pertaining to the status of women in Pakistan, Justice Kirby
pointed out that the dousing of Ms. Khawar with gasoline by her husband
took place in a context of prior threats of violence and was substantiated by
corroborating country conditions .. "It is impossible to believe that a similar
act directed to the husband or another male victim would have been treated
by police in Pakistan in such a dismissive fashion.,,7o
In his brief comments, .the chief justice agreed that persecution can be
found based on the "combined effect" of multiple agents.?l
C.

SOCIAL GROUP ANALYSIS

The definition of the relevant social group - and specifically its exact
breadth - was an issue that concerned all the Khawar justices, Justices
McHugh and Gummow ruled that the evidence supported a social group
comprising, "at its narrowest, married women living in a household which
did not include a male blood relation to whom the woman might look for

66.
67.
68.
69.

Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 114.
ld. at para. 118; see also supra note 50 and accompanying t(:xt.
Khawar (2002), 187 A.L.R. 574,at para. 122.
ld at para. 120 (footnote omitted) (quoting the New Zealand Refugee Status Appeals
Authority in Refugee Appeal No. 71427/99 (2002] N.Z.A.R. 545, para. 112).
70. ld at para. 115.
71. Jd. at para. 27.
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protection against violence by the members'ofthe household.,,72 But they
added that the specific nature of the social group was a legal matter for the
Tribunal on remand. 73
Justice Kirby noted the government argument that categories
encompassing large numbers of people, such as "women in Pakistan,"
could never satisfy the legal requirements under the Convention. 74 He
suggested that a legal focus on the failure of state protection, rather than on
the "domestic conflict," would allow an adjudicator to define a particular
social group "in a principled manner, specifically by reference to the
ground upon which the state concerned has withdrawn the protection of the
law and its agencies.,,75
The materials presented by the respondent to the Tribunal suggest
that there may be a particularly vulnerable group of married
women in Pakistan, in dispute with their husbands and their
husbands' families, unable to call on male support and sUbjected
to, or threatened by, stove burnings at home as a means of getting
rid of them yet incapable of securing effective protection from the
police or agencies of the law. In the present case, because of the
approach which it took, the Tribunal did not embark upon a
consideration of whether there was a specific, and thus identifiable,
"social group" of such a "particular" character and, if so, whether
the respondent was a member ofit. 76
The chief justice observed, again in brief, that "In my view, it would be
open to the Tribunal, on the material before it, to conclude that women in
Pakistan are a particular social groUp.,,77
D. NEXUS

Chief Justice Anthony Gleeson ruled that the nexus requirement is

72. !d. at para. 81.
73. !d.
74. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 AL.R. 574,
pani. 128,2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austlii.edu.aulaulcases/cthlhigh
_ctl20021l4.html ([2002] HCA 14); cf Regina v. Immigration Appeal Tribunal, ex parte
Shah, 2 AC. 629 (H.L. 1999) (U.K.) (approving "women in Pakistan" as social group).
75. Khawar (2002), 187 AL.R. 574, at para. 126.
76. Id. at para. 129. In the United States, cases have been decided on narrowly tailored
social groups. See In re Kasinga, 21 L & N. Dec. 357 (B.LA 1996) (noting that recognized
social groups often encompass within their definition many of the elements of an asylum
seeker's burden of proof, which must be proven in order to be granted asylum); Guidelines
on International Protection: "Membership of a Particular Social Group" Within the
Context of Article IA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, supra note 4, at para. 19 ("A claimant must still demonstrate a wellfounded fear of being persecuted based on her membership in the particular social group,
not be within one of the exclusion grounds, and meet other relevant criteria."); Knight,
supra note 19, at 691-92.
77. Khawar (2002),187 AL.R. 574, at para. 32.
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satisfied where at least one agent of persecution is motivated by a
Convention reason.
Where persecution consists of two elements, the criminal conduct
of private citizens, and the toleration or condonation of such
conduct by the state or agents of the state, resulting in the
withholding of protection which the victims are entitled to expect,
then the requirement that the persecution be by reason of one of the
Convention grounds may be satisfied by the motivation of either
the criminals or the state. 78
This is a crucial line of reasoning that, as with Lord Hoffman's powerful
example of the Jewish shopkeeper in Shah, recognizes the nature of the
persecution and the context in which it takes place.

E.

A DISSENT

Justice Ian Callinan dissented. He would have ruled that the Tribunal
was correct in holding that there was no nexus between the violence
suffered by Ms. Khawar at her husband's hand and any ground for asylum
in the Refugee Convention.
I cannot regard it as erroneous for the Tribunal ... to approach the
case upon the basis that, however the sociai group might be
defined, another cause was identified, and in my opinion correctly
identified, as the reason for the abuse. What the Tribunal did was
to identify the actual cause of the violence. Once it had done so, it
was apparent that it was a different cause, or, that it occurred for a
different reason, from any Convention reason. And that cause,
coupled with reluctance, rather than deliberate abstention, by the
police, still could not amount to a Convention reason. 79
Justice Callinan also questioned whether Ms. Khawar had been persecuted,
quoting from the opinion of the dissenting judge below:

It would, in my mind, be an incorrect use of the word 'persecution'
to apply it to a failure or lack of interest by the police to come to
the aid of a person who has been beaten at least where the law
provides, if enforced, adequate protection and there is no
government policy that police ignore calls for help ....
Persecution involves the doing of a deliberate act, rather than
inaction. 8o
In his opinion, the chief justice responded to this point by noting that the
question of governmental protection cannot easily be put aside by simply
78. Jd. at para. 31.
79. ld. at para. 156.
80. ld. at para. 149.
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characterizing the government's position as one of inaction: "Whether
failure to act amounts to conduct often depends upon whether there is a
duty to act . . . .,,81
Justice Callinan conceded that Ms. Khawar's "vvlnerability as a
woman in an abusive relationship may have contributed to the reluctance of
the police to assist her."S2 But Justice Callinan questioned the definition of
the particular social group with reference to gender. "To regard half of the
humankind of a country, classified by their sex, as a particular social group
strikes me as a somewhat unlikely proposition. A group must be part of
something less than a whole. . .. [T]here needs to be a clear linkage or
common thread between the people said to constitute the particular social
group.,,83
F.

CONCLUDING HIGH COURT GUIDANCE

Two of the High Court opinions set out some guiding parameters for
judges to consider in hearing asylum claims based on family violence.
They were responding perhaps to concerns raised in the dissent, as well as
seeking to provide some guidance for lower courts adjudicating these cases
in the future. In a central paragraph, Chief Justice Gleeson made explicit
his response to certain concerns surrounding the making of a legal
judgment that a domestic violence surv~vor should not be returned to a
particular country. He cautioned that,
.
[1]t would not be sufficient for Ms Khawar to show
maladministration, incompetence, or ineptitude, by the local police.
That would not convert personally motivated domestic violence
into persecution on one of the grounds set out in Art. IA(2). But if
she could show state tolerance or condonation of domestic
violence, and systematic discriminatory implementation of the law,
then it would not be an answer to her case to say that such a state
of affairs resulted from entrenched cultural attitudes.
An
Australian court or tribunal would need to be well-informed about
the relevant facts and circumstances, including cultural conditions,
before reaching a conclusion that what occurs in another country
amounts to persecution by reason of the attitude of the authorities
to the behaviour of private individuals; but if, after due care, such a
conclusion is reached, then there is no reason for hesitating to give
effect to it. 84
A similar note was struck by Justice Kirby:

81. /d. at para. 28.
82. /d. at para. 152.
83. Khawar (2002). 187 A.L.R. 574, at para. 153.
84. /d. at para. 26.
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Many countries (including, at least until quite recently, Australia)
have afforded imperfect protection to women who suffer domestic
violence. It does not follow that it is impossible to distinguish
those countries that, however imperfectly, provide agencies of the
law and non-discriminatory legal rules to address the problem from
those countries that, for supposed religious, cultural, political or
other reasons, consciously withdraw the protection of the law from
a particularly vulnerable group within their society.85 .
With these instructions, the Australian High Court reversed the Tribunal's
denial of asylum to Ms. Khawar and remanded the case for further
proceedings. 86

V. NEXUS: A WAY OUT
With its decision in Khawar, the High Court of Australia has added its
powerful voice to a growing wave of precedent f:lVoring asylum from
domestic violence and further solidified the foundation for progress in
recognizing other forms of gender-based violence, such as trafficking for
prostitution, sexual slavery, and honor killing. Because it is interpreting
the same refugee definition, Khawar is persuasive authority in the United
States on the subject of the breadth of that definition, and U.S. courts
should consider its reasoning.
The Khawar decision was issued at almost the same time as UNHCR's
new guidelines on gender-related persecution,87 and it is consistent with the
UNHCR's affirmation "that the refugee definition as a whole should be
interpreted with an awareness of possible gender dimensions in order to
determine accurately claims to refugee status.,,88 On the subject of nexus,
the gender guidelines are simple arid straightforward:

In cases where there is a risk of being persecuted at the hands of a
non-State actor (e.g. husband, partner or other non-State actor) for
reasons which are related to one of the Convention grounds, the
85. Id. at para. 130.
86. Id. at paras. 37, 90, 132.
87. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees, supra note 4; Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a
particular social group" Within the context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or
its 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4. These guidelines are a
product of the UNHCR's process of "Global Consultations" marking the fiftieth anniversary
of the Refugee Convention in 200 I. The guidelines reflect in part the work of Rodger
Haines, whose paper on gender-related persecution was presented at the Expert Roundtable
on Gender Persecution in San Remo,. Italy, Sept. 6-8, 200 I, and who is among the experts
who contributed to the Michigan Guidelines. See Hathaway, supra note 22.
88. Guidelines on International Protection: Gender-Related Persecution Within the
context of Article 1A(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating to the
Status ofRefugees, supra note 4, at para. 2.
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causal link is established; whether or not the absence of State
protection is Convention related. Alternatively, where the risk of
being persecuted at the hands of a non-State actor is unrelated to a
Convention ground, but the inability or unwillingness of the State
to .offer protection is for reasons of a Convention ground, the
causal link is also established. 89
UNHCR thus adopts the formula that Persecution = Serious Harm + The
Failure of State Protection, and subscribes to the notion that the nexus
requirement is satisfied by proof of a causal link between either. This
formulation has also been embraced by leading international scholars in the
field,90 who emphasize that the focus of the nexus inquiry is properly on the
reasons for the asylum seekers' fear, "and not on the personal motivations
of potential persecutors. ,,91
.
The UNHCR has stated that,
[A] particular social group is a group of persons who share a
common characteristic other than their risk of being persecuted, or
who are perceived as a group by society. The characteristic will
often be one which is innate, unchangeable, or which is otherwise
fundamental to identity, conscience or the exercise of one's human
rights.92
'
Additionally, the Australian chief justice's suggestion that "women in
Pakistan" be recognized as a particular social group is in conformity with
UNHCR's observation that some jurisdictions have recognized "women"
as a social group,93 and points out that the size of a group" is not a relevant
criterion in determining whether a particular social group exists.,,94
The Khawar case .presents an interesting comparison to the leading
domestic violence asylum case in the United States, In re R_A_.95 Unlike
that negative decision, which has been extensively written about

89. Id. at para. 21,
90, As stated in the Michigan Guidelines:
The causal link between the applicant's predicament and a Convention
ground will be revealed by evidence of the reasons which led either to the
infliction or threat of a relevant harm, or which cause the applicant's country
of origin to withhold effective protection in the face of a privately inflicted
risk Attribution of the Convention ground to the applicant by the state or
non-governmental agent of persecution is sufficient to establish the required
causal connection,
Hathaway, supra note 22, at 215, para. 8.
91. Foster, supra note 22, at 338.
92, Guidelines on International Protection: "Membership of a particular social group"
within the context ofArticle lA(2) of the 1951 Convention and/or its 1967 Protocol Relating
to the Status of Refugees, supra note 4, at para, 11,
93, Id. at para, 18.
94, Id. at para. 19.
95. In re R- A-, Interim Dec. 3403 (B.l.A. 1999), vacated(AG 2001).
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elsewhere,96 Khawar arose in a setting where there was limited factual
development of the claim, and even unresolved allegations in the record
that the applicant's entire story was fabricated. 97 Yet, rather than struggle
to reshape the law to avoid granting her asylum, as the majority attempted
in Matter of R-A-, the Khawar court made a straightforward positive legal
ruling on her eligibility under the existing law.
As Justice Kirby pointed out, Ms. Khawar's application for asylum
from domestic violence is consistent with case law in Canada, the United
Kingdom, and New Zealand.98 With its decision in Khawar, Australia now
stands with these and other countries in recognizing gender violence as a
proper basis for a grant of asylum. With the addition of the well-reasoned
Khawar decision, there now exists a "substantial body of international
practice,,99 interpreting the Refugee Convention to include protection from
gender-based violence as a basis for asylum. In this regard, the United
States increasingly stands alone in its resistance to recognizing the refugee
from domestic violence.

96. See, e.g., Karen Musalo, Matter of R-A-: An Analysis of the Decision and its
Implications, 76 INTERPRETER RELEASES 1177 (1999) (discussing In re R-A-and its
potential impact); Amanda Blanck, Note, Domestic Violence as a Basis for Asylum Status: A
Human Rights Based Approach, 22 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP. 47 (2000) (arguing that the
current asylum definition is inadequate to protect women against violations of human
rights); Haley Schaffer, Notes & Comments, Domestic Violence and Asylum in the United
States: In re R-A-, 95 Nw. U. L. REV. 779 (2001) (arguing that the In re R-A- decision was
wrong because the court adopted an overly restrictive framework).
97. Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs v. Khawar (2002) 187 A.L.R. 574,
para. 8, 2002 WL 532474 (HCA), available at http://www.austliLedu.aulaulcases/cthihigh
_ctJ2oo2114.html ([2002] HCA 14).
98. Id. at para. 124.
99. Id. at para. 125.

